I. Introduction

Whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will invade Taiwan has emerged as one of the key geopolitical questions of the 21st century. Conventional thought in the past few years have framed the issue through the lens of China’s rising power, suggesting that a more dominant Beijing can wait until military and economic conditions more decisively favor a forced reunification (Beckley 2018; Mearsheimer 2001). However, this analytical framework overlooks a very critical trend: China’s relative position may already be approaching a peak (Brands and Beckley 2021). If Chinese leadership perceives that its future capabilities will be weaker, then the incentive structure on Taiwan changes dramatically. 

Instead of viewing time as an asset, Beijing may see it as a liability. The shift in perception has profound global implications. States that anticipate long-term decline are often more likely to initiate conflict, and there is a great contemporary instance that proves this reasoning. This logic, rooted in preventative war theory, suggests that the most dangerous moment is when a state fears it will soon not be the strongest (Levy 1987; Copeland 2000). 

China’s publicly stated goal of achieving the ability to invade Taiwan by 2027 has frequently been interpreted as evidence of strategic patience (U.S. Department of Defense 2023). Yet, this timeline can be best understood to reflect a deadline. A deadline from which China must act and gather resources before structural and external constraints erode its ability to coerce Taiwan to reunify. These constraints include demographic decline, economic stagnation, technological competition, internal political pressures, and an increasingly unfavorable geopolitical environment (World Bank 2023; IMF Report 2023).  

Simultaneously, Taiwan is becoming more difficult to conquer. Its military capabilities are improving, its society is consolidating around a distinct national identity, and it is receiving increasing support from regional allies and the United States (Bush 2021; Sacks 2022). The balance of power across the Taiwan Strait is therefore evolving in ways that disadvantage China over time. 

The convergence of China’s internal constraints, weakening international environment, and Taiwan’s relative position creates a narrowing window of opportunity for Beijing. Within this context, Chinese leadership may rationally conclude that the risks of inaction exceed those of immediate intervention. The result of such calculus is a preventative war scenario: the possibility that China may seek to answer the Taiwan question sooner than later (Levy 1987; Copeland 2000; Brands and Beckley 2021).

II. Preventive War

Preventive war theory provides a foundational lens for understanding why states initiate conflict under conditions of anticipated decline in power relative to another party. Unlike preemptive war, which is driven in the defensive need to counter an imminent attack, preventive war is fueled by longer-term shifts in the balance of power. A state rationalizes that conflict and security will be less attainable later than it is now (Levy 1987, pg. 82-84; Copeland 2000, pg. 16-21).

This logic has been observed in international history intensively. Concerns of encirclement by perceived rivals often push states toward risky decision-making. Russia’s wars on Ukraine and Georgia are great examples of this, as Moscow argued that NATO was encircling Russia (Mearsheimer 2014; Trenin 2022). Russian motives echoed the logic laid out before preventative war and importantly explains why Russia would prefer to look irrational than to allow its neighbors to grow closer to the U.S (Sarotte 2021). 

When applied to China, preventative war theory suggests that Beijing’s approach to Taiwan is shaped by its expectations of future weakness. If China believes that its demographic, economic, and geopolitical trends will continue to worsen relative to Taiwan and the United States, then delaying conflict may appear strategically disadvantageous (Brands and Beckley 2021; Beckley 2018). 

III. A Peaking Power

Another related concept to preventive war logic is that of a peaking power. Scholars argue that states whose growth stagnates after a period of rapid expansion are particularly prone to aggressive behavior. These “peaking powers” face a perceived yet continuous narrowing window in which they can translate accumulated power into lasting strategic gains (Organski and Kugler 1980; Giplin 1981; Brands and Beckley 2021). Oftentimes, the normal observer would categorize this period as that of consolidation, but the actor who perceives this period as stagnant would instead take it as weakness. 

China exhibits several characteristics of a peaking power. After decades of extraordinary economic growth, its expansion appears to be slowing. Domestic issues have run rampant in parallel to the economic slowdown, such as debt, declining productivity, and its very concerning demographic aging (World Bank 2023; IMF 2023). The timing of these issues and the sluggish economic growth can suggest this slowdown is systemic. At the same time, Indo-Pacific resistance to China’s rise is increasing, further limiting China’s prosperity in the long run (White House 2022; U.S. Department of State 2023). 

The combination of internal slowdown and external pushback creates a sense of urgency. Chinese leadership may believe that the favorable conditions seen a decade ago will not exist, and that decisive action is required before their absolute relative advantage vis-a-vis Taiwan erodes (Brands and Beckley 2021).

IV. China’s Internal Issues

A. China’s Demographic Crisis

China’s demographic challenges are the result of poor state directives, with the one-child policy being among the most catastrophic. The one-child policy, implemented in 1979 and removed in 2016, created long-term structural imbalances (Feng et al. 2013; Greenhalgh 2008). Today, China’s shrinking workforce cannot adequately resolve declining birth rates and cover a rapidly aging population (United Nations 2022). 

Fertility rates in China have fallen below replacement levels, and policy reforms have seen limited success. While it is not unique to China, high living costs and changing attitudes toward family continue to suppress birth rates in the nation (World Bank 2023). Unlike the United States, China does not have a strong immigration flow to offset these trends (United Nations 2022).

Demographic decline has direct impacts on military capacity. A shrinking pool of young people reduces the availability of future recruits and increases the cost of maintaining a large standing force (Beckley 2018, pg. 150-152). Over time, this could force China to significantly increase recruitment incentive bonuses and limit China’s ability to sustain prolonged conflict. Russia sees this very issue in action. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced Putin to increase recruitment incentives and strain federal financial resources in maintaining the recruited soldiers alone (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2023). 

In addition, an aging population places greater demands on social welfare systems, diverting material and human resources away from defense spending and force (United Nations 2022). The economic burden of supporting an ever increasing size of elderly population will force China to concern itself with mass domestic issues. 

Demographic trends create a clear temporal incentive from the perspective of launching a preventive war. China’s manpower advantage is likely able to uphold present projected losses without straining the current economic and welfare sectors of the state. If conflict over Taiwan is inevitable, then fighting right now would not be as calamitous to the Chinese government (Beckley 2018; Brands and Beckley 2021).

B. Economic Constraints and Structural Slowdown

China’s economic transformation over the past two decades has been unprecedented. However, the era of rapid, export-driven growth and infrastructure projects appears to be ending. Growth rates have slowed and the economy faces multiple systemic issues that may be too difficult for China to ignore (World Bank 2023; IMF 2023; Eichengreen 2012). 

Chinese labor has traditionally been viewed as lucrative because the wages are lower cost in comparison to other advanced economies. Firms do not have to pay Chinese laborers as much as they do American or European labor, making investments in China attractive (Naughton 2018). From an authoritarian standpoint, this enables China to selectively improve and allocate labor skills to suit the needs of the state. This trend exploded when China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, allowing China to overtake American export and manufacturing capabilities in the same decade as the U.S. was shifting towards a service economy (Lardy 2014).

Because China directs state resources and can concentrate the economic sector towards a specific goal, China can selectively improve labor skills over time. China is currently upgrading labor skills by investing in vocational and AI-related programs (Kenderline and Qiao 2022). On the other hand, the United States has shifted economies to focus on managerial and supervisory roles, thereby gaining the global edge in information, service, and market systems (Autor 2019). Challenging the United States in labor skills is not just for economic purposes, but for having a competing state of knowledgeable and experienced people that do not have to leave the nation to pursue those same opportunities. This “brain drain” is what other Western countries like the United States typically benefit from, and reclaiming that talent is to China’s benefit (Zweig 2006). 

However, China’s state control over the economy creates a middle income trap. As a more skilled labor force demands higher wages while China transitions some elements of its directives to a service economy, competitiveness in low end manufacturing sharply declines (Eichengreen 2012, pg. 5-7). Vietnamese and Mexican labor have increased in value relative to the Chinese counterparts (Lewis 2023). China’s tight control of the labor force requires a delicate balancing act that selectively applies free enterprise standards without increasing the prospect of rising protests or rebellion (Shirk 2007). Mexico does not see that threat as a liberal state, and Vietnam has embraced more capitalist reforms than China, making both attractive alternatives to Chinese labor. 

In addition to decreased Chinese competitiveness, the labor force has shrunk because of the aforementioned demographic declines (United Nations 2022; Wang 2021). The demographic issue sees a split in the amount of future available employees, from four grandparents to two parents and one child. The “4-2-1” trap threatens the long-term pool of productive labor and local sustainability across the nation. 

The demographic and transitioning issues come at a time where the world has found overextended supply chains to be unreliable. The pandemic revealed that nearshoring is a cost-effective alternative to relying on Chinese production, which has resulted in increased amounts of businesses moving away from China towards regional hubs (Resnick 2022; Peterson Institute for International Economics 2023). Mexico, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, and other countries have become more immediate and significant logistical states than China. This forces China to compete economically with the United States and other regional states whose competitive advantage have all steadily eroded China’s absolute leverage in labor and mass-industry capacity, not to mention its domestic governance system (Segal 2024).

V. China’s Weakening International Environment

Despite what one may think of the United States in a political perspective, it has militarily weakened China’s main strategic partners. Russia is in a grinding war of attrition that will leave it humiliated, Venezuela’s leader was captured in an extraordinary campaign, North Korea remains isolated, and Iran’s military capacity is now crippled. These regional conflicts have all decreased the amount of distractions Taiwanese allies have while also improving their domestic defense systems, leaving China militarily isolated (Brands 2022; NATO 2025).

VI. Russia

Russia has long served as one of China’s most important partners, acting as an immediate distraction for Europe and acting as a counterweight to U.S. military power (Garver 2016). However, Russia’s performance in the Ukraine war has significantly undermined its utility as a key revisionist power. Ukraine has exposed weaknesses in Russian military capabilities, depleted its ability to act abroad, and strained its economy under sustained sanctions (IISS 2025; Reuters 2026). 

Although a weakened Russia is less capable of tying down Western resources in Europe, NATO’s defense budget has still increased to a historic 5% across the alliance. On top of that, American rhetoric has only accelerated European self-dependency in supporting Ukraine and sustaining condemnation against Russia. As Europe becomes more militarily self-sufficient, any possible distraction Russia presents becomes less reliable and existential for the United States (NATO 2025; Reuters 2026; U.S. National Security Strategy 2025). 

In addition to the security issues, Russia’s dependence on China creates an asymmetrical relationship that may be more parasitic than it appears. While China benefits from discounted energy and intelligence-sharing, Russia could present itself as a defunct state after the Ukraine war ends. What if domestic turmoil in Russia threatens the cohesion of the entire nation? China, who shares a massive border with Russia, would have to concern itself with keeping Russia alive at a moment where China would benefit from having a stronger partner. 

This is concerning because it only continues to give credit to the increased prospect of preventive war. Russia’s standing reduces China’s confidence in an external environment. If future crises take place elsewhere without meaningful Russian influence or support, then the strategic risks of waiting only surmount (Brands 2022; IISS 2025). 

VII. The Middle East

We are seeing the effects of an eroded Russia in the middle east right now. Russian influence has disintegrated in Syria, and Russia has not significantly helped Iran defend itself from the Israeli-U.S. attacks on the nation (Grawjeski 2026). China is in no better position, as 40-45% of all imported gas comes from the Strait of Hormuz, further restricting Chinese access to cheaper oil options (Strait of Hormuz Monitor 2026; U.S. Department of Defense 2024). 

Energy security remains a central weakness to China. As Iranian military capacities are being reduced,  it can be argued that the war on Iran is a necessary step to reducing another future distraction to successfully pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Nonetheless, Chinese dependence on oil energy creates structural weaknesses in industrial and military capacity that become pronounced over time (U.S. Department of Defense 2024; Economy 2010).

VIII. U.S. Strategic and Economic Containment

The United States has increasingly adopted a strategic goal of constraining China’s technological and economic instruments. The United States has controlled exports on advanced semiconductors, investment, and efforts to decouple supply chains to limit China’s access to critical inputs (Bureau of Industry and Security 2025 & 2026; Segal 2024). Biden’s export controls of semiconductor exports to China, which took effect in October 2022, was such an instance of limiting Chinese access to advanced technology and items that would boost domestic Chinese production, sales, and implementation in military planning (Tan 2024). Biden’s action on China is part of a bigger strategic shift where the United States has sought to integrate China in the global economy while preventing China from obtaining a technological superiority over the United States (Tan 2024). Such actions, whether it was the first Trump administration’s tariffs or Biden’s export controls illustrate that American “containment” of Chinese capacities is bipartisan and has taken shape over a decade. 

This can be seen with American partnerships with other countries in the realms of critical minerals, semiconductor near-shoring, and accelerated defense sales across the Indo-Pacific (White House 2025; U.S. Department of Defense 2024). An adversarial Washington reduces Beijing’s leverage in the global markets where it holds the most cards. The accumulative effect reinforces the perception that Beijing may not be able to have a favorable balance of power years from now (Segal 2024; Brands 2022).

IX. The Indo-Pacific Security Environment

We now arrive at the immediate turf where a Chinese invasion is most consequential. The Indo-Pacific is the region that is witnessing significant external development in terms of security cooperation. The United States, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are all expanding bilateral and multilateral partnerships after years of slow interoperability (U.S. Department of Defense 2024; White House 2024). 

Japan’s security posture has shifted dramatically. Increased coordination with the U.S., revised strategic doctrines, and increased defense spending signal a more assertive Japanese role in regional security against China and North Korea. In fact, Japan is sending a security presence to the Philippines for the first time since World War II, with the intended purpose of supporting Philippine efforts from Chinese encroachment in western territory (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2025; The Diplomat 2026). The Philippines has expanded access to American military bases, enhancing the operational reach of American forces (U.S. Department of Defense 2024; White House 2024). 

For China, these developments are revealing an expanding theater of possible war. The probability of facing not just Taiwan and the United States, but a broader coalition, increases the long-term guarantee of a Chinese failure. As this trend is likely to continue, China’s window of opportunity seems to only close further.

X. Taiwan

A. Taiwan’s Defense Posture

Taiwan has undertaken reforms to its security strategy in light of continued Chinese aggression and the war on Ukraine (Reuters 2026a). By viewing how a Western coalition would support Ukrainian sovereignty and tactical actions against Russia, Taiwan has gained valuable insight into how it can create a defense model that deters and counters a larger adversary. Rather than trying to match China’s direct capacities, Taiwan is investing in systems that can exploit Chinese weaknesses in an invasion scenario (U.S. Department of Defense 2024; Reuters 2026b).

These operational acts include the creation of anti-ship missiles, mobile air defense systems, naval mines, and dispersed command structures across the island. The current goal of Taiwanese forces is to hopefully make an invasion prohibitively costly, denying China the immediate ability to achieve a decisive victory (U.S. Department of Defense 2024). 

Japan and the Philippines have become increasingly vocal in their support of Taiwan by linking Japan’s security to the island and enabling high-level visits, respectively (Reuters 2026c). South Korea, Australia, Vietnam, and other nations have also begun echoing concerns of aggressive Chinese actions in the region. 

The shift is surprising because Japan has been viewed as a reluctant security partner, and many East Asian states had not forgiven Japanese atrocities in WWII, for which Japan had been unwilling to repent. South Korea had prioritized North Korea as the bigger threat, and the Philippines had mostly been a country supported only by the United States. However, the Russian war on Ukraine revealed how willing North Korea proved to be in supporting Russia, as well as China’s quiet support of Russia and import of sanctioned gas (U.S. Department of Defense 2024). Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines have since grown closer to Taiwan. Massive arms sales, increasing joint-naval exercises, and diplomatic summits are all highlighting the support of Taiwan and a shared threat in China (Reuters 2026b; White House 2024). 

B. Taiwanese Identity and Political Consolidation

The most interesting change in Taiwan is the evolution of its national identity. Surveys reflect a growing majority of the population identifying as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese” (Election Study Center, NCCU 2026; Pew Research Center 2024). The shift in national identity demonstrates that Taiwanese politics are no longer as concerned with “reunifying” with China, but rather having a separate nation altogether (Election Study Center, NCCU 2026). Generational change and distinct social differences, with a more democratic and open governance system, exemplify the differences between Taiwan and China (Pew Research Center 2024). 

This shift has profound implications on Chinese actions. A population that increasingly identifies with its own state is more likely to resist any outside invasion (Pew Research Center 2024). Ukraine, in spite of its relative weakness prior to 2022, was intolerant of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and actions in the Donbas. Nationalism reduces the effectiveness of political and psychological campaigns aimed at undermining resistance of a state (Pew Research Center 2024).

Peaceful unification is increasingly out of reach as Taiwanese identity solidifies (Election Study Center, NCCU 2026). National identity is not reversible, and it reinforces the incentive to act before the gap closes. This makes it difficult for China to view an “out” of this situation, should China wish to invade. A Chinese invasion would guarantee reactions across the Indo-Pacific, and the Taiwanese people would rally around the flag in the same way Ukrainians had four years ago (Election Study Center, NCCU 2026; Reuters 26c). 

Southeast Asian states that have been wronged by Chinese encroachment on the South China Sea would tighten defense cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, such as the Philippines and Vietnam. This would threaten spillover into the South China Sea as the Philippines and Vietnam would have a vested interest in preventing more Chinese activity in their islands. The Philippines is an especially influential factor as it has a defensive pact with the United States, so there would be a strong reason for the U.S. to enter a war early on if China decides to embark on a larger attack on the Philippines in retaliation for economically or politically supporting Taiwan. 

South Korea would likely be conservative on its military resource-sharing as North Korea directly borders it, but Seoul would likely offer indirect support to Taiwan in the same way it has provided humanitarian and intelligence support to Taiwan. And depending on Washington’s reaction, Australia, Japan, and South Korea may increase forward basing support for American military readiness.

Nonetheless, it should be expected that Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, the EU, and the U.S. would impose sweeping sanctions and export controls as even a blockade of Taiwan would strain global supply chains on semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan. With 90% of the world’s semiconductor manufacturing taking place in Taiwan, an invasion of China would cripple the global economy in technological production of dual-use technologies. This would mirror Western sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, whose combined agricultural and oil output accounted for 30% of the world’s food and 10% of the world’s oil exports. The impacts would be pronounced on technological capacities of the world, but overall trade impacts would be more crippling as roughly one third of the world imports from China. 

XI. Tick-Tock

The intersection of China’s domestic issues, an unfavorable international environment, and Taiwan’s strengthening position produces a ticking clock. Each factor individually gives China some issues, but the culmination of all produce a sense of urgency that appears to be unmanageable (Brands 2022). 

Demographic decline reduces future manpower and labor capacity (UN 2022; Wang 2021). Economic slowdown and investment limits long-term resource availability, and international leverage, forces China to liberalize or face protests (World Bank 2023; Eichengreen 2012). Technological constraints the United States imposes puts a ceiling on military modernization. China’s biggest partners abroad are experiencing sluggish wars, are undergoing regime constraints, or are having their military arsenals decimated. Taiwan, on the other hand, has become more defensible while regional states align closer with it. 

This convergence creates a “zone of opportunity”, where China can still act in non-violent ways of coercing Taiwan, whether it is a blockade or sanctions. Within this zone, China can still have a reasonable chance of success, and it is seen with the Chinese annexation of Philippine islands (U.S. Department of Defense 2024; Atlantic Council 2025). It is not a direct invasion, but it is a confrontational method of coercing a state. In the case of the Philippines, China has been able to gradually increase its territorial influence within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. 

With Taiwan, it is likely that the annual Chinese naval exercises have become a form of psychological warfare to normalize Chinese activity, lulling Taiwanese citizens into a false sense of “normalcy”. Outside of these smaller successes, however, China cannot realistically force a peaceful or sharp annexation of Taiwan without resorting to war.

It is important to state that this process is not deterministic. The timing and nature of any decision to war depends entirely on leadership perceptions, risk tolerance, and international developments. However, all of these issues reveal that if China wants to annex Taiwan, then time is of the essence. 

Preventive war theory suggests that conflict becomes more likely when the expected costs of delayed action exceed the costs of immediate action. In the case of China, this threshold may be approaching if current trends stay the same.

XII. Counterarguments to Consider

A. Strategic Patience

Some analysts argue that China can afford to wait. China’s economy remains robust, and military capabilities will continue to improve. China’s global economic standing and current military assets demonstrates that time would still favor the nation. 

However, this argument assumes that China can still continue to maintain its economic status in spite of structural constraints.This argument also assumes China can keep up with the economic might of a combined Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and United States. Even if China continues to grow in absolute terms, its relative position to Taiwan and its allies may still decline. 

B. Economic Interdependence

One of the most popular arguments emphasize the costs of war in an interconnected global market. A war over Taiwan would trigger unprecedented economic disruption, harming the entire world over several commodities and products. 

While this fear is true, it assumes that economic concerns outweigh strategic and ideological issues. History before us reveals that states are willing to incur significant economic costs when core national issues are at stake. Russia has been willing to take significant sanctions and economic strain because its interests in Ukraine outweigh Moscow’s interest in the economy.  

Similarly, Israel and the United States feel their core interests far outweigh domestic and international anger over oil gas prices seen in their war on Iran. For China, Taiwan is a central component of national identity and regime legitimacy. If a nation is willing to sacrifice economic relations and interdependence by going to war, it is because that nation perceives its core interests to be at stake. That is why war is being realized through the calculations of Israel and Russia, and Chinese leadership may determine the same. 

C. Uncertainty of American Involvement

Putting aside the logistical issues that would surmount in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, the most uncertain factor of expanding a hypothetical war is America’s role in such a scenario. This argument is both a standalone and rebuttal to consider by the fact that American foreign policy is nominally ambiguous on Taiwan. The United States recognizes the strategic threat China poses, has some vested interest in maintaining the security situation in East Asia, and would prefer that another major regional war does not break out. But will the United States defend Taiwan?

The strategic ambiguity surrounding Taiwan comes from the Taiwan Relations Act, which was signed in 1979, serves to oppose any forceful invasion of Taiwan while not guaranteeing a binding defensive pact between Taiwan and the United States. The Taiwan Relations Act was signed in the same year when the United States officially recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the “representative” before international institutions. Since then, the United States has carefully balanced relations between both Taiwan and China to avoid disputes. In addition to this, the United States has used the Taiwan Relations Act to deter Taiwan from doing or stating anything that could provoke China into a military confrontation, which is what makes the Taiwan Relations Act multidimensional when speaking about American responsibilities in balancing Taiwan-China relations. 

This uncertainty and the strategic decision to defend Taiwan appears to be completely dependent on what president is in the White House. Presidents Clinton and Obama have maintained strategic ambiguity, whereas Presidents Bush Jr. and Biden have clarified they would defend Taiwan in the face of a war. While Trump has been very antagonistic towards China and has stated such defense of Taiwan as necessary for American security, his second term seems to align more with an ambiguous approach. The revolving nature of the Presidents’ attitudes towards defending Taiwan  makes it difficult to diagnose where and to what degree would American aid be expected in such a confrontation. 

Strategic ambiguity is not inherently stabilizing or destabilizing, which is why American involvement in a war scenario is included in this section. The effects of the American stance on Taiwan depends on the credibility of U.S. power and the clarity of its signaling from leadership. When strategic ambiguity is supported by consistent capability demonstrations and alliance cohesion, ambiguity -which can arguably be shifted to clarity- deters Chinese actions. However, when strategic ambiguity is paired with political volatility or mixed messaging, it invites Chinese miscalculation and may accelerate the logic of preventive war.

XIII. Conclusion

Understanding preventive war logic has important implications for policymakers. Current deterrence must be credible and multidimensional, and inaction over the South China Sea threatens to upend deterrence. Military cooperation, alliance networks, and economic coordination must all play a role in shaping China’s perception in a way that makes invasion permanently unfeasible. At the same time, measures designed to weaken China may also increase its sense of urgency, making this a very delicate balancing act.

The Taiwan question is not just a matter of a rising power confronting a weaker adversary. It is a complex convergence of growth, decline, perception, and timing. Chinese leadership may see the future as a narrowing window of opportunity to act. The trends mentioned throughout this paper increase the incentives for China to act before its position deteriorates, thereby resulting in a heightened risk of preventive war. Understanding the role of China’s domestic and international position are essential for assessing the likelihood of war and developing effective strategies to prevent such a conflict. As it stands, the greatest danger may not lie in China’s strength, but the fear that China believes itself to be weak.

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