I. Introduction

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have a very unique strategic partnership whose relationship is often regarded as one of the most cohesive in the Middle East. Both monarchies share economic foundations rooted in oil wealth and share overlapping regional security concerns (Ikenberry 2020). The UAE and Saudi Arabia have frequently collaborated on major foreign policy initiatives, particularly in countering extreme Islamism, a threat to regional instability. However, there is now a rift between the monarchies on how to resolve geopolitical challenges and overarching security issues. The boiling Saudi-Emirati rivalry has become visible in the Horn of Africa and other close regions, where they are actively pursuing influence through diplomatic engagement, military partnerships, and economic investments (Brautigam 2009). 

Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia are all countries that have emerged as a critically contested geopolitical region. These countries’ proximity to maritime chokepoints make them central to global trade and energy flows. A significant portion of the world’s shipping passes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, the Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2023). Having strategic control or partnerships over this region provides both economic and security advantages. 

Despite global neglect towards the Saudi-UAE rivalry, it is a major driver of tensions in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. Both states want to lead the Gulf regional order, carry favor in trade routes, shape security outcomes, and become economic hubs beyond oil consumption. These regional differences fragment governance and sustain breakaway actors, prolonging civil wars. An analysis of the dynamics across the Horn of Africa shows that the regional wars are not isolated but interconnected conflicts shaped by external interests (Ikenberry 2020; Brautigam 2009).

II. Divergent Visions

Saudi Arabia has recently viewed itself as the Gulf’s dominant power and the leader of the Arab World. Its size, population, defense budget, and custodial role over Islam’s holiest sites give it a unique claim to regional and religious leadership (Gause 2022; IISS 2024). Riyadh has been a regional financial and political center for decades. 

However, the United Arab Emirates has increasingly asserted itself in the region. The UAE has a dynamic foreign policy, which includes economic investments, diplomatic maneuvering, technological development, and military support (Krief 2023; Ulrichsen 2023). The UAE seeks a central role in global trade and regional security. This creates an intra-group tension. Saudi Arabia wishes to maintain its leadership role, while the UAE is challenging it. The contest between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not for dominance, but about who sets the terms of regional order, particularly in the Horn of Africa (Gause 2022; Ulrichsen 2023).

III. The Post-Oil Middle East

Another major factor of competition is the economic transformation of the past decades. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are attempting to reduce their oil dependence and position themselves as economic hubs for alternative energy and technology (IMF 2023; World Bank 2023). The Iran War emphasizes their desire to diversify their exports, especially as major energy consumers have started exploring alternatives to oil. 

The UAE has already made tremendous progress in this regard. Dubai has become a major financial, logistical, and tourist center in the Middle East. Emirati firms have established a global footprint by expanding in the port and logistic sectors (Krieg 2023; Ulrichsen 2023).

Saudi Arabia is attempting to replicate and surpass the UAE’s economic strategy with the Vision 2030 Program. Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in infrastructure, logistical ports, and has supported foreign investment initiatives (IMF 2023; World Bank 2023). Saudi Arabia has also required multinational companies to establish a regional headquarters in Riyadh, showing the kingdom’s desire to redirect business activity towards Saudi territory (Krieg 2023).

As their competition heats up, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have set their eyes on the Horn of Africa. If civil wars in the region settle down, it can be a site for future lucrative infrastructure development. Ports in Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen are local assets that would consolidate influence in global commerce (World Bank 2023).

IV. Who to Engage With?

Saudi Arabia and the UAE demonstrate distinct foreign policy approaches. Saudi Arabia tends to engage with recognized central governments. Saudi Arabia believes that central governments are better diplomatic channels for stability and bilateral relationships (Lons 2026; Horn Review 2026). This contrasts the UAE’s more flexible engagement policy. The UAE is willing to engage with non-state actors and regional authorities if they can forge a transactional relationship (African Arguments 2026; Gulf International Forum 2026). 

From a diplomatic standpoint, the UAE and Saudi Arabia will clash over which government is the legitimate authority, pitting them against each other in various conflicts (Soufan Center 2026). These differing approaches only exacerbate the direct friction between Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they support different actors, creating irreconcilable parallel power systems (Reuters 2026; Al-Monitor 2026). 

A. Sudan

Sudan provides the biggest example of how Saudi and Emirati interests shape regional political outcomes. After Omar al-Bashir was removed from government in 2019, Sudan entered a brief transitional period that was rife with tensions between military actors and civilian governance, creating a fragile state (CFR 2026; Reuters 2026). This instability provided an opportunity for outside actors to shape the Sudanese government’s trajectory when the civil war started in 2023.

Saudi Arabia has aligned itself with the internationally recognized transitional government by providing financial support and diplomatic backing aimed to stabilize central authority. This approach demonstrates Riyadh’s preference for engaging with legitimately recognized governments. In contrast, the UAE moved closer to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is the most powerful paramilitary group in Sudan. Led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF controls significant economic resources, especially gold. This provides the RSF with a strong financial base independent of the central government (CFR 2026; Reuters 2025). In fact, the UAE has imported 90% of Sudan’s gold exports, signalling how integrated RSF-UAE ties are (Reuters 2025). 

Because of these factors, external influence changes the civil war’s incentive structure. The RSF’s access to funding and political networks enables it to maintain independence from the central government, thereby reducing the need to integrate and/or compromise. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia backs the Sudanese government, which is able to maintain legitimacy without the desire to accommodate the RSF. The roles Saudi Arabia and the UAE play actively prolongs the conflict by sustaining the opposing factions in Sudan (CFR 2026; Reuters 2026). 

B. Yemen

Yemen is the most direct example of Saudi-UAE competition within a shared intervention in a country. In 2015, both states joined a coalition aimed at defeating the Houthis and restoring the recognized government of Yemen. Interestingly, their objectives initially were directly aligned. However, significant rifts emerged over time (International Crisis Group 2024; Council on Foreign Relations 2026).

Saudi Arabia prioritized restoring a unified Yemen under the central authority. The Houthis, an Iran aligned Islamist faction, threaten Saudi national security (Council on Foreign Relations 2026; U.S. Department of Defense 2024). The UAE focused on supporting the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist movement seeking independence for southern Yemen. The UAE has also supported local militias that either operate independently of the central government or support the STC (International Crisis Group 2024; Reuters 2025). 

The fact that Yemen is a direct neighbor to Saudi Arabia makes the Emirati and Saudi approaches incompatible. At several points during the civil war, UAE-backed forces have directly clashed with Saudi-supported government forces (International Crisis Group 2024; Reuters 2025). 

This divergence results in a fractured political and military landscape. Although the UAE and Saudi Arabia both dislike Houthi and Iranian influence, Yemen remains a fragmented state of externally backed competing authorities. The competing visions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE directly prolong the conflict. 

Multiple armed groups with independent support have little incentive to compromise, demonstrating how the UAE and Saudi Arabia are undermining each other when strategic priorities diverge significantly (International Crisis Group 2024; Council Foreign Relations 2026). Emirati influence in the Yemeni Civil War also signals the UAE’s willingness to confront Saudi Arabia on security matters increasing between the two.

C. Somalia

Somalia has a pronounced history of political disunity and the Saudi-Emirati friction perpetuates Somalia’s fragmentation. Saudi Arabia supports the federal government in Mogadishu by providing humanitarian and economic aid aimed at strengthening national institutions and stabilizing central authority (The Century Foundation 2025; Reuters 2026a). Particularly, Saudi assistance includes budgetary advisory support, development assistance, and coordination with Somali federal authorities to reinforce governance in a country that has struggled with weak institutions since 1991, when the central government collapsed. 

Saudi Arabia supports the federal government because Riyadh aims to reduce instability and non-state actor influence in the Red Sea, which is a key maritime route that needs to be secure and stable for trade and energy flows (Reuters 2026a). Riyadh’s logic with Somalia and Yemen are very similar; both nations’ stability prevents any rogue group from threatening shipping in the way Somali pirates and Houthi campaigns have harassed exports. 

The UAE helps maintain the decentralized situation in Somalia by having direct relationships with regional breakaway entities like Puntland and Somaliland (Reuters 2026b; Critical Threats 2026). These relationships include port development agreements along the coast, bilateral security cooperation, and direct financial agreements bypassing Mogadishu. For instance, Emirati investments in ports along the northern Somali coastline provide local authorities in Somaliland with independent revenue flows and de facto recognized control over the northern coastline. In exchange, the UAE secures logistical footholds in the Gulf of Aden, which enhances its broader network of ports and trade routes with favorable status.

Emirati and Saudi relations with Somalia perpetuates the country’s internal cohesion and ability to strengthen its institutions and sovereignty. By empowering Puntland and Somaliland economically and logistically, the UAE incentivizes these breakaway regions to continue seeking independence from the federal government. This reduces Mogadishu’s ability to enforce taxation, security coordination, and control over infrastructure, which are all important levers of strengthening domestic governance. 

As external support provides resources and strategic investments necessary to sustain independent governance, regional actors strain Somalia’s federal system in turn (Reuters 2026b; Reuters 2025). In the context of Somali contemporary history, Puntland and Somaliland’s access to outside actors stunts governmental resources aimed at developing the nation. 

The Somali reflects a pattern observed over itself, Sudan, and Yemen, where Saudi and Emirati involvement produces three mutually reinforcing dynamics. Firstly, fragmented authority grows as external actors back competing entities that are competing for power within the same state. In Somalia, Saudi support for the federal government directly clashes with UAE’s backing of regional authorities, producing split systems of governance where political authority is contested between Mogadishu and sub-state entities. These divisions and domestic instability extend beyond political recognition to include control over local revenue, security forces, and infrastructure, increasing reintegration’s difficulty (Reuters 2026b; The Century Foundation 2025). 

Secondly, the continued Saudi and Emirati backing of competing factions contributes to the illicit flow of supplies across Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia, consequently leading to fighters and weapons streaming into neighboring countries as well. Somalia’s proximity to both Yemen and Sudan places it within a broader network of instability, where conditions in one conflict influence others through shared maritime routes and informal non-state actor support. 

The backing of warring factions in these countries produces casualties and attacks into Chad, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya, which is a trend that is unlikely to reverse if the core instability in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia do not stop (International Crisis Group 2024; Reuters 2026). This increases regional insecurity as migration flows, local socioeconomic inequality, and fractured governance continues to fuel tensions across borders.

Somalia also exemplifies how Saudi Arabia and the UAE entrench their external influence as the Gulf states establish long-term relationships throughout the country. UAE investments in ports and local security cooperation bind regional Somali governments to Emirati interests, whereas Saudi financial and diplomatic support reinforces Mogadishu’s reliance on outside assistance for legitimacy. The ties the UAE and Saudi Arabia have forged create lasting dependencies where all factions in Somalia require varying degrees of support to maintain their political and economic positions. Simultaneously, the presence of other actors (both in Somalia and other nations) increased competition, requiring Saudi Arabia and the UAE to deepen their involvement to preserve and expand influence (Council on Foreign Relations 2026; International Crisis Group 2024).

When all of these themes are paired together, Somalia is a case study where the Saudi-Emirati competition operates at the government formation level and the legitimacy of a country in a cohesive crisis. By enabling regional actors to function independently of the federal government, the Saudi-UAE rivalry contributes to a consistently fragmented environment that resists centralization and a long-term solution. 

V. Counterpoints

One potential counterargument that can be positioned is that Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain fundamentally aligned on broad strategic objectives, particularly in shared opposition to mass-regional threats and their efforts to transition away from oil-dependent economies (IMF 2023; World Bank 2023). From this perspective, their actions in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia can be interpreted as variations within a largely cooperative framework instead of meaningful rivalry. Periods of heightened regional tension such as the influence of Iran show that both states are willing to coordinate when faced with common security issues, reframing the perception that the UAE-Saudi relationship is defined by more alignment than rivalry.

This argument overlooks the consequences of Saudi-UAE divergences at the governmental and local levels. Saudi Arabia’s support of centralized authority clashes with the UAE’s willingness to engage with subnational actors, resulting in competing forms of political organization within the same state. These differences reflect distinct preferences to regional order which generate friction that undermines coordination and contributes to fragmentation. Because of this, conflict structure and duration are affected and increase the security impacts of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Krieg 2023; Reuters 2026).

A second counterargument emphasizes the role that internal dynamics play in shaping the civil conflicts in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. Civil wars and instability in these states are rooted in long-standing instability that predates recent Saudi-Emirati influence. Sudan has experienced the secession of South Sudan and recurring struggles between civilian and military authorities. Somalia’s fragmentation dates back to the collapse of the central government in 1991, while Yemen’s Civil War is tied to internal political divisions and the broader upheaval of the Arab Spring. These conditions, as well as the involvement of other outside powers would reason that the wars in these states cannot be solely attributed to Gulf competition (Council on Foreign Relations 2026).

This argument is well-founded as domestic issues and broader geopolitical considerations play central roles in the conflicts across Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan. However, it underestimates how strongly some outside actors shape the evolution and length of these wars. The Arab Spring and subsequent regional conflicts, such as those in Libya and Syria, facilitated the flow of weapons, fighters, and ideological elements across the Middle East and North Africa. These developments increased instability in already fragile states across the regions. As a result, the barriers to armed mobilization and willingness for non-state actors to attempt coups have only increased. In this context, external involvement amplifies domestic issues for the gain of outside players.

To this end, Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate in ways that are unique in comparison to other states. Their geographic proximity, their economic ties, and security interests in the Red Sea region make their involvement more direct and sustained. Both states have strong reasons to shape favorable outcomes in nearby conflict zones; as they have concerns in maritime security, migration, and regional political order. By providing financial, humanitarian, and military resources, the UAE and Saudi Arabia alter the internal balance of power within the affected states. This reduces the likelihood of national consolidation by sustaining the capacities of rival factions that might otherwise negotiate a settlement (Krieg 2023; International Crisis Group 2024; Reuters 2026).

These counterarguments highlight the importance of domestic developments and broader geopolitical competition, but they do not negate the Saudi-Emirati rivalry’s impact. Instead, these arguments reinforce the necessity to understand the Saudi-Emirati rivalry as a relationship that interacts with present instability to shape the future of conflicts and governance in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. Although their influence is not exclusive, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are structurally significant in determining how these conflicts evolve, why they interact with divergent entities, and why conflict persists in these countries. 

VI. Conclusion

Overall, the Saudi-UAE relationship has a growing divergence in how both states pursue influence abroad. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are advancing exclusive models of regional order and domestic governance, with one rooted in supporting centralized state authority and the other in flexible engagement with subnational actors. When applied within the same country, these approaches generate structural tensions that reshape the organization of political power in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.

The case studies also show that the divergence has consistent effects and actions across different contexts. In all three cases, Saudi and Emirati support of rival groups contributes to the emergence of competing government entities and reduces incentives for political compromise. The effects of Emirati and Saudi involvement reflect the interactions between external patronage and domestic instability, where outside influence amplifies pre-existing divisions and the length of civil wars.

The ripple effects of this rivalry extend beyond the immediate conflicts in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. The Red Sea region is a critical corridor for global trade and energy exports, with the chokepoint of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the heart of accessing the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. Persistent instability and decentralized governance therefore pose global risks to international security and economic stability. For countries seeking to promote conflict resolution, recognizing the intra-Gulf competition is essential, as stabilization efforts will remain limited if competing forms of foreign support continue to sustain rival power structures and resources. 

Bibliography

African Arguments. 2026. “The Horn and the Gulf: How a New Geopolitical Confluence Is Emerging.” Accessed March 2026. https://africanarguments.org/2026/01/the-horn-and-the-gulf-how-a-new-geopolitical-confluence-is-emerging/.

Al-Monitor. 2026. “African Union Summit Clouded by Saudi-UAE Rivalry in the Horn of Africa.” Accessed March 2026. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/02/african-union-summit-clouded-saudi-uae-rivalry-horn-africa.

Council on Foreign Relations. 2026. “Power Struggle in Sudan.” Global Conflict Tracker. Accessed March 2026. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan.

Council on Foreign Relations. 2026. “War in Yemen.” Global Conflict Tracker. Accessed March 2026. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen.

Critical Threats Project. 2026. “Somalia Situation Report.” American Enterprise Institute. Accessed March 2026. https://www.criticalthreats.org.

European Council on Foreign Relations. 2026. “Power Struggle: What the Saudi-UAE Rivalry Means for the Red Sea and Europe.” Accessed March 2026. https://ecfr.eu/article/power-struggle-what-the-saudi-uae-rivalry-means-for-the-red-sea-and-europe/.

Gause, F. Gregory III. 2022. “Saudi Arabia and the UAE: Diverging Paths.” Middle East Policy.

Gulf International Forum. 2026. “Gulf Rivalries and the Horn of Africa.” Accessed March 2026. https://gulfif.org.

International Crisis Group. 2024. “Rethinking Peace in Yemen.” Brussels: ICG.

Krieg, Andreas. 2023. “The UAE’s Foreign Policy Activism.” Contemporary Security Policy.

Lons, Camille. 2026. “Saudi-UAE Rivalry in the Red Sea Arena.” European Council on Foreign Relations.

Reuters. 2025. “UAE-Backed Forces Clash with Government Troops in Yemen.” Reuters.

Reuters. 2025. “UAE Expands Influence in Somalia’s Breakaway Regions.” Reuters.

Reuters. 2026a. “Saudi Arabia Expands Security Cooperation in the Horn of Africa.” Reuters.

Reuters. 2026b. “Somalia Annuls UAE Port Agreements.” Reuters.

Reuters. 2026c. “Regional States Reject Mogadishu Decision on UAE Deals.” Reuters.

Reuters. 2026. “Sudan Conflict Continues Amid Foreign Backing.” Reuters.

Soufan Center. 2026. “IntelBrief: Gulf Rivalries and Regional Fragmentation.” Accessed March 2026. https://thesoufancenter.org.

The Century Foundation. 2025. “Gulf Competition and State Fragility in Somalia.” Accessed 2025.